Russian Grand Priory

23/09/2025

part-131

On 28th March 1566, the foundation stone of Valletta was laid. A richly decorated altar was set up in the area where the Church of Our Lady of Victory is. Various dignitaries were present for the occasion, including Bishop Fra Domenico Cubelles, Fra Antonio Cressino, Knights and Maltese.
After the mass, the sites chosen for the land front fortifications were blessed and the Grandmaster laid the foundation stone, which had the following inscription:
"𝘍𝘳𝘢 𝘑𝘦𝘢𝘯 𝘥𝘦 𝘝𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘦, 𝘎𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘔𝘢𝘴𝘵𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘖𝘳𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘏𝘰𝘴𝘱𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘰𝘧 𝘑𝘦𝘳𝘶𝘴𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘮, 𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘧𝘶𝘭 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘰 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘢 𝘺𝘦𝘢𝘳 𝘣𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘒𝘯𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘔𝘢𝘭𝘵𝘦𝘴𝘦 𝘱𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦 𝘸𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘪𝘦𝘨𝘦 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘛𝘶𝘳𝘬𝘴, 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘭𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘖𝘳𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘢 𝘯𝘦𝘸 𝘤𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘮𝘦, 𝘣𝘺 𝘸𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘴, 𝘳𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘴𝘶𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘢𝘵𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘬 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘳𝘦𝘱𝘦𝘭 𝘰𝘳, 𝘢𝘵 𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘵, 𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘱 𝘢𝘸𝘢𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘛𝘶𝘳𝘬𝘪𝘴𝘩 𝘦𝘯𝘦𝘮𝘺, 𝘰𝘯 𝘛𝘩𝘶𝘳𝘴𝘥𝘢𝘺, 𝘔𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩 28, 1566, 𝘢𝘧𝘵𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘈𝘭𝘮𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘺 𝘎𝘰𝘥, 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘝𝘪𝘳𝘨𝘪𝘯 𝘮𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘎𝘰𝘥, 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘢𝘵𝘳𝘰𝘯 𝘚𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘵 𝘑𝘰𝘩𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘉𝘢𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘴𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘵𝘰 𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘸𝘰𝘳𝘬 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦𝘥 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘸𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘦 𝘊𝘩𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘢𝘯 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘨𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘖𝘳𝘥𝘦𝘳, 𝘭𝘢𝘪𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘥 𝘚𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘴 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢 𝘨𝘰𝘭𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘢 𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘦𝘭𝘥, 𝘩𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘴𝘩𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘯𝘢𝘮𝘦, 𝘝𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘢."
Laparelli describes the foundation stone as having been carved to exhibit the Order’s eight-pointed cross and placed in a cavity cut into the rock to receive it, together with commemorative coins and medals. He also said that the site was still surrounded by loose stone all around, Turkish trenches, shelters and graves.

23/09/2025

part-130

Immediately after the siege Grand Master Jean Parisot De Valette stated asking for financial help from the great Christian rulers of Europe. He managed to get a lot of financial help as they were impressed by the defeat inflicted on Suleiman’s war machine, with which he intended to build a stronghold in Malta in order to stop the Turks from attacking mainland Europe.

The Ottoman batteries on the Sciberras peninsula showed the weakness of the existing strongholds, and thus De Valette intended to build a new city on the hilly narrow peninsula at the far end of which there was fort St. Elmo protecting both the Grand Harbour and Marsamxett Harbour. This would improve the vulnerability of the two harbours which were considered as two of the best natural harbours in the Mediterranean.

The plan was to build fortifications along the perimeter of the peninsula shaped along the natural contours of the site which would automatically dominate and fortify the two harbours. Thus a new city on the Sciberras peninsula was being born. No time was wasted and the Pope sent Francesco Laparelli to design the fortifications and the city's urbanization. The fortifications are a result of the best European military architecture of the time.

The Ufficio delle Case (the Planning Authority of the time) regulated that the city was to be on a gridiron pattern, with none of the buildings having front gardens and all of which were to have decorated corners amongst others. The stone was to be cut from one particular site such that a manderaggio (safe port) was formed where the Order's galleys would be kept safe from both storms and enemy attack. The building of the city commenced on 28 March 1566, just over 6 months from the end of the siege.

23/09/2025

part-129

23/09/2025

part-128

Saturday 15 September

Don Garcia embarked in the morning, but owing to the weather he could not leave the harbour and was forced to stay until nightfall. It was said at the time, and confirmed later, that although the Ottomans had a head start of three days on him, he went in pursuit of them up to the Isles of the Monks, Stampalia and Cerigo [𝘎𝘳𝘦𝘦𝘤𝘦.]
#1565

23/09/2025

part-127

23/09/2025

part-126

Thursday 13 September

During the siege, we lost over 2,500 soldiers of all nationalities and 7,000 Maltese men, women and children and about 500 slaves belonging to the Order. The Ottomans had lost some 35,000 men in all. They had fired 130,000 rounds from their cannons and basilisks. By the time I left Malta, 65,000 cast iron balls had been collected and brought to St. Angelo. The Grandmaster ordered that no one could draw water unless they brought a cannonball, with the result being more efficient than if 3,000 labourers were employed for the same job. Only one man was executed during the siege, a man from Genoa who was put to death for publicly saying that we had no chance at all, and it would be better for us to accept the money and the free passage the Ottomans were offering. Marshal Robles had him hanged within sight of the enemy as soon as he came to hear of this.
#1565

23/09/2025

part-125

23/09/2025

part-124

23/09/2025

part-123

Monday 10 September

Many soldiers and Maltese came down from Mdina to Birgu, since all the Ottomans were on St. Elmo promontory. They did not move from there, but posted guards and sentries, so that if necessary they could retreat in time to their fleet in Marsamxett. The people who came down from Mdina all declared that the relief force was magnificent, composed of outstanding men, soldiers of all nations and gentlemen adventurers. The estimates of their strength varied from 9,000 to 12,000, a figure we the besieged could not believe as we had had no evidence of their prowess since they landed. Indeed their orders were not to engage the Ottomans in a pitched battle but solely to force their retreat.
I learned later from Ascanio della Corña that they did not immediately set upon the enemy for a number of reasons, the first being the safeguarding of their provisions. If they had lost these, they would have been in as bad a plight as we were in Birgu. The second reason was that Don Garcia wanted to relieve the Grandmaster and the Order by a show of force without in any way endangering the new troops. The third reason was Mdina being nine miles from Birgu and there being no water in between, they had every reason to think that the enemy would be dug in at Marsa. It seemed sensible not to lead soldiers into a position in such hot weather into a position where thirst alone could defeat them.
Although Ascanio’s reasons were sound, there was a great deal of arguing, and the opportunity should not have been lost. It was well known that the Ottomans had been on the island for four months, which was so barren that there was no possibility of provisions. They had lost large numbers of men, apart from those who had sickened and died from disease. Finally, it was common knowledge that the troops were withdrawn from the trenches to man the galleys.
There was the argument that had 4,000 arquebusiers combined with the fleet pretended to attack the Ottoman fleet, the enemy artillery could have been captured as the Grandmaster hoped to do. Furthermore, we might have captured or burned the fleet at Marsamxett. The fact remains that while men are always willing to discuss past events, they have no knowledge of the orders their superiors may have had from their princes, or indeed their plans. In this way, men often misjudge generals.
By now the relief force had reached Mdina and Ascanio billeted the infantry in the suburb where there were two church, one dedicated to St. Paul and the other to St. Francis. The gentlemen adventurers were billeted in the city awaiting orders. Meanwhile the locals rushed out from Birgu to the enemy gun platforms salvaging what wood they could to restore the burnt or destroyed houses.
During the night a Genoese escaped from the enemy fleet and made his way to Birgu, where he said openly in the square that the fleet had left Marsamxett without leaving anything behind. They had burned anything that was not essential including old ropes, sails and woollen sacks so we Christians could not avail of them.
He also said that all fighting men, about 10,000, were still ashore and had provisions for three days. They had been left behind as they were sure the relief consisted of no more than 4,000. They intended to lay two ambushes, one of them at St. Michael, where they hoped the news of the relief force landing would make us relax our vigilance.
The troops had been left ashore because of a quarrel between the pashas, each of whom had accused the other for the failure of the siege. Mustapha Pasha charged Piali with negligence saying that had the latter kept command of the sea as the sultan had ordered, the relief force would not have landed. Piali replied that since the sultan had charged him with the royal fleet so dear to the sultan’s heart, he could not take the same risks as if he had just four galleys. He maintained that Mustapha was to blame as he had the forces to capture Malta but failed to do so, while he had been keeping watch in the places where the Christians would most likely try to land.
After a long and bitter argument, Mustapha was of the opinion that they should leave immediately while Piali argued in favour of the troops remaining on land, trying to force them into battle. If they were as few as the accounts said Mustapha would defeat them and go on to capture Malta. If not, they soldiers would make their way to St. Paul's Bay where they would embark. At least he would have seen them with his own eyes, and could give an account to the sultan, as otherwise, he would not be able to give a proper account of what he had fled from to the sultan. Mustapha was convinced by Piali's argument and took his advice.
As soon as he learnt this, De Valette sent Monsieur de Boisbreton to Mdina to inform the leaders of the relief force. He gave no order but that they should act as they deemed best in the circumstances. He also issued strict instructions under pain of death, that no soldier who had been in Birgu or St. Michael was to go outside the walls, and every man was to remain on guard as they had during the moments of greatest peril.
#1565