Pakistan has played a surprisingly important role on the world stage since Independence. Its strategic location explains why, squeezed between the powerhouse of India, and Afghanistan, long an arena for competing empires to play out their rivalries. Knowing its relative weakness compared to Delhi, Islamabad has continually pursued the idea of ‘strategic depth’ to bolster its position, seeking to t
ie down the Indians in Kashmir while encouraging the formation of a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul to secure its restive Pashtun borderlands. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the Durand Line became an active Cold War frontline. The Americans were determined to force the Soviets out and Pakistan became their base of operations. Billions of American dollars were spent supporting the mujaheddin (Islamic fighters) who were prepared to enter Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and fight. The Pakistani leader at the time, General Zia ul Haq, couldn’t believe his luck and proceeded to skim off vast amounts of the American money. Mujaheddin who saw the anti-Soviet war as a largely nationalist struggle were sidelined by Zia in favour of the most radical Islamist factions. These continued to be supported following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 in the hope that they would form a new Afghan government. When this gambit failed, the Pakistanis acted as midwives to the new Taliban militia, helping them take eventual control of the country. At the same time, other radicals were encouraged to take the fight to Kashmir. Because it gave shelter to Osama bin Laden, the Taliban was removed from power by the Americans after 11 September 2001. In the process, the Pakistanis once again were in a position to benefit because the Americans now wanted to pay Pakistan to help destroy the very forces they had together created. Since then, relations between Islamabad and the newly democratic Kabul government have been rocky to say the least, with Pakistan again voicing support for negotiations with the regrouped (and rearmed) Taliban. Pakistan has found itself in a tricky position. On the one hand it wants to encourage Islamic militancy so that there are enough young fighters to keep the Kashmiri struggle alive. On the other hand, it is trying to shut the militants down so as to prevent the possibility of an Islamic revolution at home and also to please the West and keep the aid dollars flowing in. Given the increased international focus on Islamic extremism it is unclear how long Pakistan will be able to sustain what has become a very difficult balancing act
